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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, as 
amended, provides in pertinent part: 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage 
the appellate process. The Legislature may 
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of 
the Legislature. 
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 (1990) provides in pertinent 
part: 
(1) The court shall order that a defendant 
who has been found guilty of an offense and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail 
or prison, and who has filed an appeal or a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, be 
detained, unless the court finds: 
(a) the appeal raises a substantial 
question of law or fact likely to result in: 
(i) reversal; 
(ii) an order for a new trial; or 
(iii) a sentence that does not 
include a term of imprisonment 
in jail or prison; 
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose 
of delay; and 
(c) by clear and convincing evidence 
presented by the defendant that he is not 
likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, 
and will not pose a danger to the physical, 
psychological, or financial and economic 
safety or well-being of any other person or 
the community if released. 
Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides in relevant part: 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, 
or probation shall be stayed if an appeal is 
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taken and a certificate of probable cause is 
issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the 
state, a stay of any order or judgment in 
favor of the defendant may be granted by the 
court upon good cause pending disposition of 
the appeal. 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be 
issued if the court hearing the application 
determines that there are meritorious issues 
that should be decided by the appellate 
court. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The state asserts jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 
78-2-2(3)(g), explaining that "in substance" the trial court held 
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 unconstitutional. (State's brief p. 
1). This Court accepted jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78-
2-2(3)(g). (Minute Entry, Case No. 910314, State's brief 
Appendix C). It is unclear that jurisdiction lies for this 
matter. The district court did not declare section 77-20-10 
unconstitutional; rather the district court held that Rule 27 is 
the governing law regarding the issuance of a certificate of 
probable cause for a stay of sentence pending appeal. (T. 5, 6, 
10-11, 50). Uncertainty was also expressed by the Court of 
Appeals, which in transferring this case to the Supreme Court, 
stated that "[w]e make no determination whether the trial court's 
order granting a certificate of probable cause is a judgment 
appealable by the State." (Order of Transfer, Case No. 910172-
CA, State's Brief Appendix B). Plainly, if this Court now 
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determines that the trial court did not hold Section 77-20-10 
unconstitutional, no jurisdiction exists for this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The central issue on appeal is whether a stay of 
sentence pending appeal is governed by Rule 27 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure or Utah Code Ann. section 77-20-10. The 
standard of review for this question is a "correction of error" 
standard. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 
1984). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a jury trial, appellee C. Dean Larsen was 
convicted under Utah's securities fraud law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 (Supp. 1991). (R. 1434-51). Mr. Larsen 
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (R. 1424-91). 
Mr. Larsen was also ordered to pay a fine and restitution on each 
count. (Id.) 
Following sentencing, Mr. Larsen filed a petition with 
the district court for a certificate of probable cause to stay 
execution of the sentence pending appeal. That appeal, which 
involves an issue of first impression regarding the necessary 
mental state for criminal liability under Utah securities law, is 
currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court by petition for 
certiorari. (Case No. 920114). The district court granted Mr. 
Larsen's petition and ordered that his "sentence is stayed 
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pending a final disposition of the matter on appeal." 
(Certificate of Probable Cause, March 4, 1991, attached as 
Appendix A to State's Brief). Mr. Larsen was required to post a 
$10,000 surety bond in addition to complying with all previous 
court orders regarding his release. (Id.) 
The district court issued the Certificate of Probable 
Cause "pursuant to the provisions of Rule 27, U.R.CR.P. based 
upon the fact that the Court determines there are several issues 
that are novel or at least fairly debatable." (State's Brief, 
Appendix A; see also State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 
1985)(under Rule 27, "the question raised [on appeal] must be 
either (1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah precedent that governs, 
or (2) fairly debatable.")). The State appealed the district 
court's order granting the stay. The Utah Court of Appeals 
issued an Order of Transfer of the State's appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, stating that the trial court had "in effect" held 
Utah Code Section 77-20-10 unconstitutional. (Order of Transfer, 
Case No. 910172-CA, State's Brief Appendix B.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts beyond those set forth above concerning this case 
are unnecessary for this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court correctly applied Rule 27, Utah R. 
Crim. P. in deciding Mr. Larsen's petition for certificate of 
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probable cause- Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 does not apply because 
the subject of release pending appeal is a procedural law matter 
within the Utah Supreme Court's authority. 
The issue of whether the subject of release pending 
appeal is either procedural or substitutive law cannot be 
resolved simply by placement of a label as conflicting state 
court decisions reveal. A reasoned, issue-specific analysis, an 
analysis applied by the federal courts, reveals that the matter 
is one of procedural law within the Court's province, as this 
Court's treatment of Rule 27 reflects. 
Section 77-20-10 cannot be characterized as an 
amendment to Rule 27, as the State urges, because the legislature 
did not expressly amend Rule 27 as required by Article V and 
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Article VIII, 
Section 4 and Article V of the Utah Constitution require a clear 
statement of legislature intent to amend rules promulgated by the 
Court. Section 77-20-10 also violates the United States 
Constitution. The trial court correctly concluded that Rule 27, 
not section 77-20-10, is the law to be applied. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RULE 27 GOVERNS 
The issue here appeal is whether the district court was 
correct in applying Rule 27 Utah R. Crim. P. and not section 77-
20-10 to decide Mr. Larsen's request for a stay of sentence 
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pending appeal. In deciding the issue, it is useful first to 
chronicle how the Utah Supreme Court has regarded Rule 27 in the 
face of past efforts by the State to change the Rule. This 
appeal by the Utah Attorney General's officer as we explain 
below, is the most recent attempt among many to add more 
stringent conditions to the Court's requirements for stays 
pending appeal. Following this, we analyze the constitutional 
issues. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY TREATED RULE 27 
AS PROCEDURAL 
Rule 27 was first adopted by the Court in 1985 when it 
issued the following Per Curiam Order: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as 
amended, the Court adopts all existing 
statutory rules of procedure and evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of 
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by 
this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985. 
In Re; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1985)(copy attached as "Appendix A"). In promulgating these 
rules, the Court met its constitutional obligation: Mft]he 
Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be 
used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the 
appellate process." Utah Const, art. VIII S 4; see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1992, enacted 1986)(containing same language 
as Utah Const, art. VIII S 4). The Supreme Court heralded the 
1985 revision of Section 4 of Article VIII of the Utah 
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Constitution, noting that the changes were significant because 
"the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court now have the tools to 
manage their own affairs and to enhance their status as a co-
equal branch of government." Code of Judicial Administration, 
Introduction I 4. 
Shortly after the Court adopted the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, including Rule 27, the State attempted to 
change the Rule 27 requirements, arguing that the standards of 
the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act should be used. See State v. 
Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985)(per curiam). The Court rejected 
this suggestion: 
Our rule does not contain the language 
urged by the State, but is rather patterned 
after the federal law prior to the 1984 
changes. The previous federal law required 
that, in order to be admitted to bail pending 
appeal, a defendant must raise a substantial 
question which should be determined by the 
appellate court . . . . 
We hold that under our Rule 27, in 
issuing a certificate of probable cause 
preliminary to consideration of release 
pending appeal, the court must determine that 
the issues of fact or law raised on appeal 
are substantial. 
Id. at 649 (emphasis added). 
The State through the Attorney General then approached 
the 1986 Legislature with "proposed amendments" to Rule 27 
resembling the language of section 77-20-10. (See May 15, 1986, 
Attorney General's Memorandum in Support of State's Petition for 
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Amendments, a copy of which is attached as Appendix B). 
Subsequently, the Attorney General's office petitioned the Court 
to amend Rule 27 directly, having concluded that "any proposed 
changes to Rule 27 should first be presented to the Utah Supreme 
Court which has the ultimate authority to adopt and amend rules 
of procedure." (State's 1986 Memo. p. 1, Appendix B). The 
petition requested that Rule 27 be amended to contain language 
similar to that of the Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3143. 
(See State's Petition for Amendment to Rule, a copy is contained 
in Appendix C). l 
As early as September 1987, changes to Rule 27 were 
being considered by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 Supreme Court Advisory Committees 
were established in all areas where the Court has rulemaking 
authority, including criminal procedure. Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 11-101(1)(B). Advisory Committees, such as 
the Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, are established by 
xBy Minute Entry on August 6, 1990, over two years after 
section 77-20-10 became effective, the Court stated: "Pursuant to 
passage of U.C.A. 77-20-10 on April 25, 1988. [sic]. This request 
for rule change is now resolved." The meaning of this order 
remains unclear in view of the relief originally sought by the 
State. (See State's 1986 Memo. pp. 6-9, Appendix B). 
2See Minutes of Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Sept. 14, 1987, I 6 (public record file kept 
by Administrative Office of the Courts)(Rule 27 subcommittee 
reports that "its work was steadily progressing" and that "the 
subcommittee was collecting Law Review Articles on the Federal Bail 
Reform Act"). The committee's work on Rule 27 continues today. 
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the Supreme Court pursuant to its authority and responsibility 
under Article VIII, Section 4, to adopt rules of procedure to be 
used by all courts of the state. Under this authority, the Court 
promulgated the Code of Judicial Administration to "establish[] a 
procedure for the adoption, repeal and amendment of rules of 
procedure and evidence." Code of Judicial Administration Rule 
11-101(1) (A). The composition of Supreme Court Advisory 
Committees broadly represent the legal community, and should 
include "practicing lawyers, academicians, and judges" who 
"possess expertise within the committee's jurisdiction." Id. at 
Rule 11-101(1)(C). 
Efforts continued in the legislature in January 1988 to 
alter the criteria for stays pending appeal through House Bill 79 
(H.B. 79). (A copy of the entire H.B. 79 is attached as Appendix 
D). H.B. 79, sponsored by State Representative Ervin Skousen 
with assistance from counsel with the Attorney General's 
office,3 passed and was codified as section 77-20-10 of the Utah 
Code. House Journal 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 247 (Jan. 26, 1988); 
Senate Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 732 (Feb. 23, 1988). 
One year later, through its Article VIII rulemaking 
powers, the Utah Supreme Court issued another Per Curiam Order: 
3See Minutes of Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Feb. 8, 1988, I 8 (Attorney with the 
Attorney General's office "assisted in the drafting and preparation 
of the legislation [H.B. 79]"). A copy of the entire Minutes for 
February 8, 1988 is contained in Appendix F. 
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Pursuant to the provisions of article 
VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, 
as amended, and rule 11-101(3)(E) of the Code 
of Judicial Administration, the Court adopts 
all existing statutory rules of procedure and 
evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
35-1 to -33 (1982 & Supp. 1988) not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of 
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by 
this Court, with the exception of section 77-
35-12(aWsee State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987)) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and 
(d)(see State v. Copeland, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 [765 P.2d 1266] (Dec. 6, 1988)). Effective 
as of January 1, 1989. 
In Re: Rules of Procedure and Evidence to be Used in the Courts 
of this State (per curiam) (Utah S.Ct. Jan. 13, 1989) (copy 
attached as Appendix E). One of the statutes adopted by the 
Court as its own rule was Utah Code Section 77-35-27 (1982, 
repealed effective July 1, 1990)(copy attached as Appendix I) 
which contained language identical to Rule 27. Section 77-35-27, 
which concerned stays pending appeal, was adopted by the Court 
after the legislature passed section 77-20-10 which also puirports 
to establish requirements for release pending appeal. 
This history reflects that the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently regarded the requirements under Rule 27 for 
obtaining a stay of sentence pending appeal to be a matter of 
procedure decided by the Court pursuant to its rulemaking 
authority under Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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II. RELEASE PENDING APPEAL INVOLVES PROCEDURAL LAW 
Determining whether a law is procedural, within the 
province of the Court, or substantive, and thus within the 
province of the legislature, is often a difficult task/ 
Generic definitions of what is procedural law and what is 
substantive law offer limited help depending upon the issue. As 
we explain below, a more practical approach, focusing on the 
subject at issue, and whether the issue has primarily been a 
function of the judiciary or of the legislature, is a more 
sensible way to determine which branch of government ought to be 
responsible for adopting rules with respect to the subject. 
In Utah, a law is considered procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, if it "does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested rights." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990); 
Department of Social Serv. v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 
1982). In an early case, Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 
1948) the Utah Supreme Court offered the following definition of 
procedural and substantive law: 
Substantive law is defined as the positive 
law which creates, defines and regulates the 
rights and duties of the parties and which 
may give rise to a cause for action, as 
distinguished from adjective law which 
AThis is evidenced by the fact that the Attorney General's 
Office has simultaneously petitioned this Court and the legislature 
in an effort to change the requirements for release pending appeal. 
See pp. 7-10 supra; see also Appendix B, p.l (State's Memorandum in 
Support of its 1986 Petition). 
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pertains to and prescribes the practice and 
procedure or the legal machinery by which the 
substantive law is determined or made 
effective. 
Id. at 693-94 (quoted in Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
Assoc., 795 P.2d 665, 668-69 (Utah App. 1990)). 
No Utah case has expressly held that the standards for 
a stay of sentence pending appeal is procedural or substantive. 
However, as previously noted, the Court has issued two per curium 
Orders adopting Rule 27 along with the other Rules of Criminal 
Procedure pursuant to the Court's constitutionally-based 
procedural rulemaking power. See Appendices A and E. 
Consistently, (and as the State concedes) the Court in State v. 
Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985) (Per Curium) referred to and 
treated Rule 27 as the Court's own rule. (State's 1986 Memo. pp. 
7-8, Appendix B). 
As the State recognizes, other state courts addressing 
whether this issue is procedural or substantive have reached 
different results, often for different reasons. (State's Brief 
pp. 10-12). Federal decisions, which the State does not 
consider, have consistently determined that the provisions of the 
Federal Bail Reform Act, on which Utah's section 77-20-10 was 
modeled (see infra at pp. 25-31), is a matter of procedural law. 
United States v. Ballone, 762 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1200-1201 (7th Cir. 1985); 
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United States v. Crabtree, 754 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.) cert, denied 
473 U.S. 905 (1985); United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 21 
(3rd Cir. 1985). These decisions provide a useful analysis. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United 
States v, Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948-51 (1985)(en banc), agreed 
with the weight of federal authority that the standards of 18 
U.S.C. Section 3143 governing bail pending appeal were procedural 
in nature, and therefore held that there was no violation of the 
ex post facto clause which only applies to substantive law. The 
reasoning of Affleck and other federal decisions is that 
requirements for release pending appeal are procedural because 
they do "'not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients 
of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish 
guilt.'" Id. at 948 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 
n.12, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 n. 12 (1981)). 
These decisions reflect a reasonable, issue-specific 
approach in deciding whether a rule is procedural or substantive 
law; for often a rule can be fairly characterized as being both 
procedural and substantive• See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 967, 970 (1987)("Rules regulating 
matters 'which, though falling within the uncertain area between 
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification 
as either.'"Wquoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85 S. 
Ct. 1135 (1965)). The characterization of a law as substantive 
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or procedural depends on the purpose of the characterization. 
See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 1989 Duke L.J. 281 (1989); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" 
in the Conflict of Laws. 42 Yale L.J. 333, 335 (1933). 
The above authorities reveal that the power to 
promulgate conditions for granting a stay of sentence pending 
appeal lies with the judiciary which has been the branch of 
government primarily and historically involved with this subject, 
as the Washington Supreme Court observed in State v. Smith, 527 
P.2d 674 (Wash. 1974): 
[T]he fixing of bail and the release 
from custody traditionally has been, and we 
think is, a function of the judicial branch 
of government, unless otherwise directed and 
mandated by unequivocal constitutional 
provisions to the contrary. The power of the 
courts at common law is very well paraphrased 
in 8 Am. Jur.2d Bail & Recognizance, § 8 
(1963), pp. 787-88 
Authority to grant bail 
generally is incidental either to 
the power to hold a defendant to 
answer, or to the power to hear and 
determine the matter in which the 
defendant is held. At common law 
courts had inherent power to grant 
bail to prisoners before them and 
over whom they had jurisdiction. 
Granting bail and fixing its amount 
is generally a judicial or quasi-
judicial function; . . . 
(Footnotes omitted.) Since the inherent 
power to fix bail is grounded in the power to 
hold a defendant, and thus relates to the 
manner of ensuring that the alleged offense 
will be heard by the court, we believe it to 
be implicit that the right to bail is 
essentially procedural in nature. Therefore, 
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we hold that CrR 3.2(h) was validly 
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
its inherent rule-making authority to 
prescribe rules of procedure. 
527 P.2d at 677. 
The State advances two reasons why release pending 
appeal ought to be considered substantive law. First, the State 
argues that labeling this issue as substantive is "consistent 
with article I, section 8(2)" in that release pending appeal is 
available "'only as prescribed bv law.'" (State's Brief at 
p.13)(emphasis in State's Brief). In so doing, the State 
erroneously implies that the phrase "by law" means only "by 
statute." This is simply wrong. See Minutes of Const. Revision 
Comm., Jan. 15, 1988, p.2, I 7 (January 15, 1988)(Attached as 
Appendix G)(State Constitutional Revision Commission intended "to 
retain the use of the phrase 'as prescribed by law' in the second 
paragraph [of Article I, § 8] because it can mean statutes, court 
rules, or court cases"). 
Second, the State aligns with a dissenting opinion in 
State v. Currincrton, 700 P.2d 942, 946-48 (Idaho 1985)(majority 
held that release pending appeal is procedural law), implying 
that denying bail pending appeal is appropriate as "punishment." 
This misperceives the purpose of bail. The purpose of bail is 
not punishment, but is to secure the defendant's continued 
attendance at future court proceedings. See In re Pipinos, 654 
P.2d 1257, 1264 (Cal. 1982); State v. Muscrrove. 610 P.2d 710, 712 
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(Mont. 1980); see also federal cases cited at pp. 12-13 supra, 
including United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir. 
1985). 
Based on the above issue-specific analysis, the Court 
has been correct in regarding Rule 27 as a matter of procedural 
law properly within the Court's rulemaking power. This being so, 
Court Rule 27, not Section 77-20-10, controls the standard for 
release pending appeal unless and until the Court modifies the 
Rule, or until the legislature expressly amends Rule 27 by proper 
vote. See pp. 16-19 infra; see also Slusher v. Ospital by 
Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 443 n. 12 (Utah 1989)(conflict between a 
court rule and a statute relating to rule must be resolved in 
favor of rule); Utah R. Criiru P. 1 (c)(statutes in conflict with 
rules are repealed); People v. Williams, 577 N.E.2d 762, 764 
(111. 1991), citing People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988)(rule 
prevails over conflicting statute in matters within court's 
authority). Thus, the district court's decision to apply Rule 27 
in issuing the Certificate of Probable Cause in this case should 
be affirmed. 
III. SECTION 77-20-10 DID NOT AMEND RULE 27 
Section 77-20-10 did not alter Rule 27 as the State 
suggests because the legislature did not expressly amend the rule 
as Article V, Section 1 and Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution require. Section 4 of Article VIII empowers the 
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judiciary to "adopt rules of procedure . . . to be used in the 
courts of the state." The Utah Constitution confers a limited 
right on the legislature to "amend" these rules which must be 
considered in connection with the separation-of-powers provision 
of Article Vf which states: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V S 1. 
The legislature may "exercise the powers" conferred 
upon the judiciary only as "expressly directed or permitted" by 
the Utah Constitution. .Id. The Constitution does not permit the 
legislature to promulgate Rules of procedure; the Constitution 
expressly provides only that "[t]he legislature may amend the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon 
a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature." Utah Const, art. VIII S 4. Thus: 
Given the fact that the Utah Constitution 
places with this court the authority to 
promulgate rules of procedure and places 
certain limitations on the legislature's 
alterations of those rules, see Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, S 4, we certainly will not find 
that the legislature has intended to alter 
the operation of the rules of procedure 
absent a clear statement to that effect. 
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Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 800 P.2d 1095f 1097 n. 4 (Utah 
1990). A "clear statement" that Section 77-20-10 was intended to 
amend Rule 27 is not found in the statute, either in its codified 
form or as H.B. 79. (See Utah Code Ann. S 77-20-10; a copy of 
H.B. 79 is attached as Appendix D). In fact, H.B. 79 expressly 
states that it "Amends" Utah Code Ann. SS 77-20-1 and 77-20-8; it 
contains no reference to Rule 27. (Appendix D). 
The legislature is aware that the correct method for 
attempting to alter procedural rules requires an express 
declaration of intent. See e.g., H.J.R. No. 26, 49th Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Feb. 2, 1992)(copy in Appendix H). The first line of 
H.J.R. No. 26, a joint resolution concerning a "fully informed 
jury" proposal, declared its purpose of "AMENDING THE RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE . . . ." Id. This clear intent is repeated 
at the beginning and end of the resolution. .Id. H.B. 79, which 
became section 77-20-10, contained no such language. (Appendix 
D). 
Express legislative intent to amend is not only 
constitutionally required, it is necessary for the judiciary to 
function effectively. Under the State's view, courts may be 
forced to sift through legislation, first to identify all laws 
that passed by two-thirds vote of both the Senate and House of 
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Representatives,5 and then scrutinize those enactments to 
determine if the legislation "sought to alter the standards" 
(State's Brief pp. 14-15) of any procedural rule and thus should 
be deemed an "amendment" to one or more procedural rules. This 
is unworkable and not contemplated by Article VIII, Section 4 of 
Utah's Constitution. 
Further, rules of procedure may have retroactive effect 
in proceedings under way. See e.g., Department of Social 
Services v. Hicrcrs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); Smith v. Cook, 
803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). Thus, trial courts and counsel, 
unable to monitor the legislature or to discern readily whether a 
given statute amends a rule of procedure, could not labor free 
from the danger that the "wrong" rule would be applied. 
Additionally, without a "clear statement" of intent (an express 
amendment), as the Utah Constitution requires (Utah Const, art. V 
§ 1; art. VIII § 4), legislation not intended to alter court 
rules could nonetheless provide fertile ground for argument that 
the converse is true. Appeals would proliferate. 
The amendment-by-inference analysis urged by the State 
is unworkable and ill advised. 
5This is no small task; the clear majority of all legislation 
in Utah this year passed by at least two-thirds vote in both the 
house and senate. See House Journals, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess. Jan. 
13-Feb. 26, 1992); Senate Journals 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., (Jan. 13-
Feb. 26, 1992). 
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IV. SECTION 77-20-10 VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
As noted in the jurisdictional statement set forth 
herein, it is unclear precisely what the trial court held with 
regard to Utah Code Section 78-20-10. This Court has invited the 
parties on this appeal to address the constitutionality of 
Section 77-20-10 on the basis that the trial court had 
effectively ruled the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, if 
the trial court's ruling can be supported on any basis this Court 
should uphold the ruling. 
In addition to the Utah Constitutional infirmities 
associated with Section 77-20-10 as set forth in Parts II and 
III, supra (i.e. violation of the separation of powers provision 
of Article V § 1 and of the Judicial rulemaking provision of 
Article VIII § 4), the unique language in Section 77-20-10 also 
raises serious federal constitutional concerns if it were to be 
applied by Utah courts. Appellee briefly identifies these 
federal constitutional issues here. 
Section 77-22-10 requires a showing Mby clear and 
convincing evidence by the defendant" that his release pending 
appeal would not present a flight risk and that the defendant's 
release "will not pose a danger to the physical, psychological. 
or financial and economic safety or well-being of any other 
person or the community if released." (Emphasis added). This 
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underlined language in section 77-20-10 is the only part of the 
Utah statute which differs significantly from the language of 18 
U.S.C. S 3143, of which the Utah statute is modeled. The cited 
additional language in section 77-20-10 violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it is so 
vague and overbroad as to effectively and unreasonably preclude 
bail, especially as may be applied in this case. 
Although courts have held that the U.S. Constitution 
does not guarantee a right to release on bail pending appeal, see 
e.g., Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 594, 597 (2nd Cir. 1979), if a 
state implements a bail system, it must do so in a fair and 
reasonable manner, because the determination of bail affects 
significant issues regarding the liberty interests of 
individuals. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. 
Ct.2095, 2101 (1987); Young v. Hubbard, 673 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 
1982); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as 
moot sub nom; Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982). States have a 
legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the potential 
for repeat offenses by defendants with a propensity for dangerous 
or violent crimes. However, the state's interest is much less 
compelling as to non-violent crimes. Yet Section 77-20-10 
applies the same stringent bail requirements to persons convicted 
of economic crimes as persons convicted of violent crimes. The 
statute also makes no distinction between the seriousness of the 
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crime at issue. Misdemeanor defendants are not treated any 
differently than felony defendants—even those convicted of 
capital offenses. 
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court was 
faced with a challenge to a provision of the Federal Bail Reform 
Act covering pre-conviction detention based on findings that the 
accused had a propensity to commit additional crimes. The Court 
held that the provision did not violate due process and was 
reasonable, because that statute focused "only on individuals who 
have been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious 
crimes." 481 U.S. at 750. In Young v. Hubbard, 673 F.2d 132 
(5th Cir. 1982) and Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 594 (2nd Cir. 
1979), denial of bail pending appeal was upheld because a state 
scheme in those cases was limited to questions of public safety 
and flight risk. However, there is no corresponding state 
interest in cipplying the same standard to defendants who can show 
that they pose no significant risk to the safety of the 
community, but who cannot demonstrate because of the vagueness of 
the statute that they do not pose a risk to the "psychological, 
financial or economic" safety of the community or "of any other 
person." 
The language of section 77-20-10 is so vague and so 
broad that it defies definitions: What is "psychological 
safety"? What is "financial or economic safety"? This language 
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of the statute, which is a departure from the federal model, is 
so vague that judicial interpretation and definition of the terms 
in any meaningful way is impossible. While it may be 
overreaching to say that the state has no interest in protecting 
its citizenry from "economic" and "psychological" harm, the 
language of section 77-20-10 to protect that interest is 
overbroad. The standards used in relation to such economic 
concerns should not be governed by the same criteria as applied 
to persons convicted of violent crimes. 
Whatever the language of section 77-20-10 means, there 
is no limitation on its application to defendants who pose no 
risk of violence or other legitimate state interest/ no way to 
distinguish between defendants convicted of a misdemeanor as 
opposed to a felony, no way to distinguish between serious and 
violent crimes and status offenses, and no way to meet the burden 
of proving by a clear and convincing standard that release will 
not result in some sort of psychological discomfort or economic 
burden on a third party. In effect, the statute if read 
literally would result in the complete deprivation of access to 
bail. 
In this case, Mr. Larsen was convicted of allegations 
that he failed to make certain disclosures in connection with 
securities offerings. See Petition for Certiorari, Case No. 
920114. Mr. Larsen has no previous criminal record, is a long-
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term resident of the State of Utah and has demonstrated at every 
stage of this case that he does not pose a flight risk. If this 
matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to review 
the certificate of probable cause under the standards set forth 
in section 77-20-10, application of those standards in this case 
will result in a violation of the constitutional standard set 
forth above. If Mr. Larsen is to be detained under the statute, 
the only basis for doing so will be on the premise that he 
somehow poses a threat to the physical "economic or financial 
safety" of the community. That language as applied in this case 
clearly exceeds any valid state interest. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court could have 
reasonably held that Section 78-22-10 was unconstitutional on its 
face6 or as it may be applied in this case. 
6Judge McKay's dissent in United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 
944, 955-61 (10th Cir. 1985) provides additional reasons why a 
statute such as Utah section 77-20-10 may be considered 
unconstitutional on its face. Judge McKay notes that in Evitts v. 
Lucev, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985), the Supreme Court found 
that where a state provides for an appeal as a matter of right, 
then "the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution." Id. 
At 834. Accordingly, in Evitts, the court held that a defendant 
has a due process right to effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal because "in establishing a system of appeal as of right, the 
state has implicitly determined that it was unwilling to curtail 
drastically a defendant's liberty unless a second judicial 
decisionmaker, the appellate court, was convinced that the 
conviction was in accord with law." Id. At 840. The state was 
thus found to have "made the appeal the final step in the 
adjudication of guilt or innocence of the individual." JEd. Evitts 
extended a defendant's fifth amendment right to counsel at trial to 
right to counsel on appeal where the state had affords defendants 
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V. IF THE COURT DETERMINES TO REMAND, IT SHOULD 
INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT TO INTERPRET SECTION 77-
20-10 CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL LAW 
The State asks for reversal of the trial court's ruling 
and remand for reconsideration of the certificate of probable 
cause under Section 77-20-10. (State's Brief p. 15). The trial 
court's decision should not be disturbed, as we have explained. 
However, if this court determines to do so, it should instruct 
the trial court to interpret 77-20-10 consistent with its federal 
model for two reasons: First, the legislative history of the 
statute indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to 
follow with federal law on the issue of post-conviction release. 
Second, the interpretation adopted by the federal courts presents 
the only possible interpretation of 77-20-10 which avoids an 
absurd result. 
A. The Legislature Intended Section 77-20-10 To 
Follow Federal Law 
It is clear from the face of section 77-20-10 that, 
with one significant modification, the statute is modeled after 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), which is part of the Federal Bail Reform Act 
a right to appeal as a matter of statutory right. The rationale 
of Evitts should apply to a defendant's eight amendment right to 
bail, which also had typically been held to only apply to the pre-
trial stage. Inasmuch as Utah affords defendant's a statutory 
right to an appeal, see Utah code S 77-18a-l(l)(1991), the eighth 
amendment rights against excessive bail arguably attach to the 
appeal. To the extent that Section 77-20-10 excessively curtails 
this right, it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments of the 
United States Constitution. 
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of 1984. The structure of the two statutes if virtually 
identical and both use virtually identical language in expressing 
the grounds for release on bail pending appeal. See Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-20-10; 18 U.S.C. S 3143. 
In additionf the legislative history regarding this 
issue indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to 
align Utah and federal law. In introducing H.B. 79, which became 
section 77-20-10, representative Skousen, the sponsor of the 
bill, opened his comments by stating as follows: 
House Bill 79 had developed as a result of 
some experiences here in the community which 
reflect the fact that we need to bring all 
laws in conformance with the federal law. 
The federal law recently amended the bail 
requirements and specifications and our laws 
now presently do not conform to those federal 
laws. 
(Transcribed from Official record of Utah State House of 
Representatives, Floor Debate re H.B.79, January 26, 1988). 
The bill was introduced to the Senate by Senator Kay 
Cornaby, who stated as follows: 
I should emphasize this is post conviction 
only and it conforms to the federal statute. 
My understanding is that the drafter of the 
bill tracked the federal bail statute with 
post conviction remedies in structuring the 
amendment for Utah State. 
(Transcribed from Official record of Utah State Senate, Floor 
Debate re H.B. 79, February 23, 1988. (emphasis added)). 
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The decisions of the federal courts deserve significant 
deference in interpreting state statutes modeled on federal law: 
Where a state statute is patterned after a 
federal statute, the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and inferior federal 
courts, interpreting the parent federal 
statute, are, even though they were handed 
down after the adoption by the state of the 
federal statute, most persuasive, 
particularly where such interpretations are 
the only ones extant with respect to the 
disputed words of the state statute. 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes S 335 (1974) (emphasis added); see also 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) ('[t]he primary 
rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent 
of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve"); State v. Tavlor, 82 Ariz. 289, 312 P.2d 162, 165-66 
(1957)(subsequent interpretation of federal statute was entitled 
to "great weight" in construing state statute); Geraahtv v. 
National Bank of Commerce, 8 Wash.2d 437, 112 P.2d 846, 849 
(1941). 
From the foregoing it is clear that the legislature 
crafted section 77-20-10 to align Utah and federal law on the 
issue of post-conviction bail, and that federal case law should 
be followed in construing section 77-20-10. 
B. The Federal Standard 
Both section 77-20-10 and its federal-law model (18 
U.S.C. S 3143) contain the following language: "raises a 
substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal 
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or an order for a new trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3413(b)(2); Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-20-10(1)(a). Taken at face value, as other courts have 
observed, this language arguably could be read to mean the trial 
court should only permit a post-conviction release if it is 
convinced that its own rulings and handling of the case were in 
error. The federal courts have recognized the inherent absurdity 
of this interpretation. In United States v. Greenberq, 772 F.2d 
340 (7th Cir. 1985)f the Seventh Circuit analyzed United States 
v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19t 23-24 (3rd Cir. 1985) and its definition 
of the quoted language: 
[T]he Third Circuit held that the quoted 
language entitled the defendant to bail 
pending appeal (provided he is not a danger 
to anyone or likely to fleef 18 U.S.C. 
S 3143(b)(1) if his appeal raises a 
substantial question that is likely to result 
in a reversal if the court of appeals answers 
the question in the way the defendants asks 
it to do. This of course is not what the 
language says; but if it were read literally, 
the district judge could not grant bail 
pending appeal unless he though the 
conviction was going to be reversed — and if 
he thought that, why would he not have set 
aside the conviction himself without putting 
the defendant to the bother of appealing and 
us to the bother of reversing? The literal 
reading amounts to saying that district 
judges shall not grant bail pending appeal/ 
leaving the courts of appeal with sole 
authority to do that . . . . If Congress 
meant to abolish the district court's power 
to grant bail pending appeal/ it chose an 
awfully roundabout way of expressing its 
desire. 
Greenberq, 772 F.2d at 341. 
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The following Federal Courts of Appeals agree with the 
Miller rational: United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 297-
98 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952-
53 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Handy, 761 F.2d 
1279, 1280-83 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 
1227 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Randell, 761 
F.2d 122, 124-25 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); 
and United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam). 
The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Affleck, 
articulated what has come to be the federal standard for 
interpreting section 3143(b). The court adopted a two-part 
inquiry; first, does the appeal raise a "substantial" issue for 
appeal;" and second, "if the question is determined favorably to 
defendant on appeal, is that decision likely to result in 
reversal or an order for a new trial of all counts on which 
imprisonment has been imposed." Id. at 953. Cf.. Nealev, 707 
P.2d at 649 (applying similar test under Rule 27, Utah R. Crim. 
P.). For purposes of this test, "substantially" has been 
interpreted to mean an issue which "is novel, has not been 
decided by controlling precedent, or which is fairly doubtful." 
Id. (quoting United States v. Miller. 753 F.2d at 23). 
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The Federal Courts of Appeal agree that Congress could 
not and did not intend to eliminate the procedural power of the 
district courts to grant bail to convicted defendants whose cases 
are on appeal by requiring a trial judge to somehow rule that his 
decisions in the case were erroneous and "likely to be reversed." 
Such a definition cannot be tolerated under federal law should 
not be tolerated under Utah law.7 
Surely the Utah Legislature could not have expected a 
lower court judge to rule on an issue of law, and then conclude 
that he was likely wrong and would be reversed on appeal. If a 
trial court did have such an opinion, the court would more likely 
change his own decision before entering a final appealable order 
or judgment. Thus, a literal interpretation of section 77-20-10 
is unworkable and nonsensical, and would place a release pending 
appeal beyond any defendant's reach. For this reason, federal 
courts have interpreted the federal statute very similar with 
this Court's interpretation of Rule 27. The legislative history 
of section 7 7-20-10 indicates that the legislation was designed 
to make Utah law consistent with federal law on this point; this 
7If Section 77-20-10 is applied literally, it would also be 
open to attack on numerous constitutional grounds as an arbitrary 
elimination of a statutory right to bail in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and a violation of due process because a fair hearing 
would be impossible where a trial court is asked to act in effect 
as its own court of appeals. See Generally, Lay and Hunt, The Bail 
Reform Act of 1984: A discussion 11, William Mitchell L. Rev. 929, 
950 (1985). 
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Court should implement that standard if it concludes that section 
77-20-10 is the law to be applied in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should affirm the 
trial court's decision to apply the standards of Rule 27 in 
granting a stay of sentence pending appeal. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 1992. 
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[COMPILERS NOTE: This administrative 
order is published at the request of the Utah 
Supreme Court.] 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
Rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of this state. 
FILED: September 10,1985 
PER CURIAM: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, 
Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as amended, 
the Court adopts all existing statutory rules 
of procedure and evidence not inconsistent 
with or superceded by rules of procedure and 
evidence heretofore adopted by this Court. 
Effective as of July l t 1985. 
TabB 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (415 9) 
Assistant Attorney General 
A t t o r n e y s fo r t h e S t a t e of Utah 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 533-7606 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: RULE 27 , UTAH : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STATE'S PETITION FOR 
AMENDMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The S t a t e of U t a h , t h r o u g h t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , 
i n i t i a l l y a p p r o a c h e d t h e 1986 L e g i s l a t u r e w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d 
amendments t o Utah R. Crim. P . 27 (UTAH CODE ANN, § 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 7 
(1982)) t h a t a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n . A f t e r H.B. 
165 , which c o n t a i n e d t h e Rule 27 amendments , was approved by t h e 
House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , s ee HOUSE JOURNAL, 4 6 t h L e g . , 1 s t S e s s . 
282 ( d a i l y e d . J a n 27 , 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e sponso r of t h e b i l l and 
a t t o r n e y s from t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e and t h e S t a t e w i d e 
A s s o c i a t i o n of P r o s e c u t o r s a g r e e d t h a t any p roposed c h a n g e s t o 
Rule 27 s h o u l d f i r s t be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t which 
has t h e u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y t o a d o p t and amend r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e S t a t e f i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n for amendment t o t h a t 
r u l e . 
7 S ' f 
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PISCUSSIQN 
A. 
Under the recently amended version of a r t i c l e VIII , 
section 4 of the Utah Cons t i t u t i on , ! which was approved by the 
voters in November 1984 and became effect ive on July 1, 1985, 
t h i s Court has the ult imate author i ty to adopt and amend rules of 
procedure. The amendments to a r t i c l e VIII cons t i tu t iona l ized the 
Court 's rule-making au thor i ty , which had previously only been 
accorded by s t a t u t e . £££ UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-4 (1977); 1943 
Utah Laws ch. 33, § 1 (which gave the Court rule-making power in 
a l l c i v i l a c t i ons ) . The Legis la ture may amend the rules of 
procedure adopted by the Court only upon a vote of two-thirds of 
the members of both houses. UTAH CONST, a r t . VIII , section 4. 
In a recent opinion in a criminal case, State v. Banner, 32 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5, P.2d (1986), t h i s Court noted tha t , under 
1 Art ic le VIII , section 4 now s t a t e s : 
The supreme court shal l adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the s t a t e and shal l by rule manage 
the appel la te process. The l e g i s l a t u r e may 
amend the rules of procedure and evidence 
adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of 
the l e g i s l a t u r e . Except as otherwise 
provided by t h i s cons t i tu t ion , the supreme 
court by rule may authorize r e t i r e d j u s t i c e s 
and judges and judges pro tempore to perform 
any jud ic ia l du t i e s . Judges pro tempore 
shal l be c i t i zens of the United S ta t e s , Utah 
res iden t s , and admitted to prac t ice law in 
Utah. The supreme court by rule shal l govern 
the pract ice of law, including admission to 
pract ice law and the conduct and d i sc ip l ine 
of persons admitted to prac t ice law. 
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§ 78-2-4,2 n[t]he limitations on rules announced by this Court 
which supplant legislative enactments are that the Court may not 
change the substantive rights of any litigant; the rules must 
only be procedural in nature." 32 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. Banner 
referred to Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Gibbons Realty, 668 
P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983), as instructive on the distinction 
between procedural rules and substantive rules. In Brickyard, 
668 P.2d at 539, the Court approved of the following standard set 
forth in Avila South Condominium Ass'n.r InCt v. Kappa Corp./ 347 
So.2d 599 (Fla. 1977): 
Practice and procedure encompass the 
course, form, manner, means, method, mode, 
order, process or steps by which a party 
enforces substantive rights or obtains 
redress for their invasion. "Practice and 
procedure" may be described as the machinery 
of the judicial process as opposed to the 
product thereof. 
Examination of many authorities leads me 
2 Section 78-2-4 provides: 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by 
rules, for all courts of the State of Utah, 
the forms of process, writs, pleadings and 
motions and the practice and procedure in all 
civil and criminal actions and proceedings, 
including rules of evidence therein, and also 
divorce, probate and guardianship 
proceedings. Such rules may not abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of 
any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme 
Court shall fix the date when such rules 
shall take effect and thereafter all laws in 
conflict therewith providing for procedure in 
courts only shall be of no further force and 
effect. Nothing in this title, anything 
therein to the contrary notwithstanding, 
shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal 
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the 
Supreme Court. 
-^-
to conclude that substantive law includes 
those rules and principles which fix and 
declare the primary rights of individuals as 
respects their persons and their property. 
As to the term "procedure," I conceive it to 
include the administration of the remedies 
available in cases of invasion of primary 
rights of individuals. The term "rules or 
practice and procedure" includes all rules 
governing the parties, their counsel and the 
Court throughout the progress of the case 
from the time of its initiation until final 
judgment and its execution. See Kellman v. 
Stoltz, 1 F.R.D. 726 (N.D., Iowa, 1941). 
347 So.2d at 608 (quoting In re Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 272 So.2d 65f 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkinsf J., 
concurring)). The proposed amendments to Rule 27 should be 
evaluated against this standard. 
In In Re: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 18 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (1985), the Court stated: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utahf as 
amended, the Court adopts all existing 
statutory rules of procedure and evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of 
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by 
this Court. Effective as of July lf 1985. 
This pronouncement, when viewed in light of the rule-making 
standard noted in Banner and Brickyardy raises several issues. 
First, there is the question of the extent to which the Court 
adopted as its rule of criminal procedure the provisions 
contained in the Rule 27 enacted by the Legislature in 19 80 and 
codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-27. 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 
1. Since receiving full rule-making power in 1943, the Court 
apparently has never independently devised and adopted rules of 
criminal procedure; the Legislature has historically performed 
this task. _£££ UTAH CODE ANN. § 105-1-1 et seq. (1943); UTAH 
- y i _ 
CODE ANN. § 77-1-1 e t seq. (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-1 e t 
seq. (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 e t seq . (1982) .3 This has 
not been the case with the r u l e s of c i v i l procedure or the r u l e s 
of ev idence . See Banner, 32 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 10; Br ickyard , 668 
P.2d a t 539. In Re; Rules of Procedure marks t he f i r s t time 
t h a t the Court has independent ly adopted r u l e s of c r imina l 
procedure ; and i t did so through an apparent wholesa le adopt ion 
of the l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted r u l e s conta ined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-35-1 e t seq. (1982) . There being no p rev ious ly Court-adopted 
r u l e s of c r imina l p rocedure , the L e g i s l a t u r e ' s r u l e s presumably 
a re now the C o u r t ' s r u l e s — u n q u a l i f i e d . 
The p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 27 (§ 77-35-27) which the S t a t e 
wishes t o have amended r e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o a convic ted d e f e n d a n t ' s 
e l i g i b i l i t y for r e l e a s e pending appeal—something t h a t appears t o 
involve s u b s t a n t i v e law r a t h e r than procedural law. 4 See Avi la , 
347 So.2d a t 608. Assuming t h a t a c r imina l d e f e n d a n t ' s q u a l i f i e d 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o b a i l before t r i a l / see UTAH CONST, a r t . 
I , S 8 (Supp. 1985); Car lson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524f 545-46 
(1952); £ l . Bel l v. Wolf ish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n. 15 (1979) 
(where the Court refused to decide the open ques t i on of whether 
the e igh th amendment p rov ides a r i g h t to b a i l in cases where the 
defendant i s not l i k e l y t o f l e e ) , may be f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t e d a f t e r 
c o n v i c t i o n , see United S t a t e s v . Aff leck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th 
3
 In 1980, the L e g i s l a t u r e , for the f i r s t t ime f s p e c i f i c a l l y 
des igna ted the r u l e s of c r imina l procedure and s e t them a p a r t in 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 . 
4
 To the c o n t r a r y , subsec t ion (a) of Rule 27 appears t o be 
procedura l only . 
Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("There is no constitutional right to bail 
pending appeal."), the question of when a convicted defendant may 
be released with or without bail pending appeal seems to be one 
which involves the fixing and declaration of an individual's 
primary rights rather than simply the method or process by which 
a party enforces substantive rights.5 Indeed, the State's 
proposed changes seek to restrict those who are eligible for 
release pending appeal in two significant ways: (1) narrowing 
the class of defendants who are eligible for a certificate of 
probable cause by requiring a showing of "a substantial question 
of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new 
trial," and (2) restricting release of defendants issued a 
certificate to those who can demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that they will not flee or present a danger to any other 
person or the community. See State v. Neeley, 707 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1985) (which sets forth a less restrictive standard for the 
defendant regarding the substantiality of issues presented on 
appeal); State v. Pappas, 696 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1985) 
(holding that, once a certificate of probable cause is issued, 
"there should be a strong showing of the necessity of custody 
before bail is denied"). This Court seemingly recognized the 
substantive nature of the rule when the State previously 
requested that Rule 27(b) be construed in accordance with the 
5 The apparent mixture of substantive and procedural elements in 
§ 77-35-27 may have been an oversight by the Legislature. 
Creation of the qualified right to release pending appeal 
probably would have been more appropriate outside of the context 
of a rule of criminal procedure. 
language now proposed for subsection (b) in the ins tant pe t i t i on . 
See Neeley, 707 P.2d a t 648-49 (observing that the language from 
the federal 1984 Bail Reform Act re l ied on by the State ref lected 
several changes which marked a n I s i g n i f i c a n t departure from the 
basic philosophy1 of the purpose of b a i l " ) . Thus, if the Court 
adopted subsections (b) and (c) of § 77-35-27 as part of i t s own 
Rule 27, i t arguably did so in v io la t ion of the rule-making 
standard enunciated in Banner and Brickyard. Therefore, i t i s 
imperative tha t the Court f i r s t designate which provisions in § 
77-35-27 i t has adopted as part of i t s rule of criminal 
procedure. When t h i s i s made c lear , the State wi l l know which 
governmental body i t should pe t i t ion for the proposed changes in 
the law. For example, if the Court decides i t did not adopt 
subsections (b) and (c) of § 77-35-27 because they contain 
matters of substantive rather than procedural law, the State wi l l 
submit i t s amendments to the Legis la ture , knowing tha t , because a 
Court ru le i s not involved, the two-thirds majority vote required 
under a r t i c l e VIII , section 4 wi l l not be necessary for adoption 
of the amendments.6 On the other hand, if the Court did adopt 
those subsect ions, the S t a t e ' s pe t i t ion for amendments i s 
properly before the Court. In te res t ing ly , in Neeley, a case 
decided af ter In Re: Rules of Procedure was issued, the Court 
proceeded as though subsection (b) of § 77-35-27 was the Cour t ' s 
6 The assumption would be tha t § 77-35-27(b) and (c) would remain 
in effect as provisions of substant ive law duly enacted by the 
Legis la ture . 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. Not being part of a 
Court-adopted rule of procedure, amendments to those provisions 
would not require the cons t i tu t iona l ly mandated two-thirds 
majority for l e g i s l a t i v e amendment to such a ru l e . 
- 7 -
ru le . Indeed, if Neeley i s in terpre ted as indica t ive of the 
Court 's belief tha t i t was appropriate to adopt a l l of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted Rule 27 pursuant to the Cour t ' s rule-making 
function, there appears to be no obstacle to considerat ion of the 
S t a t e ' s proposed amendments to tha t rule in t h i s forum. 
B. 
Assuming tha t the S t a t e ' s pe t i t i on i s properly before 
the Court, the proposed amendments to Rule 27 should be adopted. 
The language the State requests the Court to adopt i s s imilar to 
that found in a federal s t a tu t e enacted as part of the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act. ££& 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (1985). The purpose of the 
federal l e g i s l a t i o n was to reverse the former presumption in 
favor of bai l even af ter conviction. Two important p r inc ip les 
are thereby furthered: 
Once gu i l t of a crime has been es tabl ished in 
a court of law, there i s no reason to favor 
release pending imposition of sentence or 
appeal. The conviction, in which the 
defendant 's g u i l t of a crime has been 
establ ished beyond a reasonable doubt, i s 
presumably correct in law. 
Second, release of a criminal defendant 
into the community af ter conviction may 
undermine the de ter rent effect of the 
criminal law, especia l ly in those s i t ua t i ons 
where an appeal of the conviction may drag on 
for many months or years . 
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, repr in ted in 1984 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3209. _£££ also United Sta tes v. 
Austin* 614 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 n. 13 (D.C.N.M. 1985). For these 
same reasons, Utah should incorporate the federal pos i t ion . 
Furthermore, the proposed changes to Rule 27 would eliminate the 
ambiguities in t h i s Court ' s "novel" or " fa i r ly debatable" 
- « -
standard for determining what is a "meritorious issue" on 
appeal.7 Neeleyf 707 P.2d at 649. 
Finally, although this Court has never addressed the 
constitutionality of Rule 27, there can be little dispute that 
the current rule, as well as the proposed amendments, do not 
violate the bail or due process provisions of the fifth and eight 
amendments to the United States Constitution. Affleck, 765 F.2d 
at 948; United States v. Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir. 
1985). And, although Utah's constitutional provisions on those 
subjects are textually somewhat different from their federal 
counterparts, there appears to be no good reason to interpret 
them so as to invalidate the pertinent provisions of current Rule 
27 or the proposed changes to that rule. See UTAH CONST, art. I, 
§§ 7 and 8 (1971 & Supp. 1985) . BuL S&£ Affleck, 765 F.2d at 
955-59 (McKay, J., dissenting). Significantly, this Court has 
never expressed any doubts about placing restrictions on a 
convicted person's freedom pending appeal. See, e.g., Neeley: 
Pappas* 
CONCLUSION 
Several interrelated issues must be resolved in the 
process of disposing of the State's petition for amendments to 
Utah R. Crim. P. 27. It appears that the Court first needs to 
7
 This is not to say that the newly enacted federal standard has 
not engendered some debate as to its proper interpretation and 
application. Compare Affleck, 765 F.2d at 952, with United 
States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3rd Cir. 1985). However, 
overall that standard is clearer than the one opted for in 
Neeley* 
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make c l e a r which p r o v i s i o n s of § 77 -35 -27 i t a d o p t e d a s i t s own 
Rule 27 when i t i s s u e d In Re: R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e . T h i s w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e an a n a l y s i s of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e C o u r t ' s 
r u l e - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y no t e d i n Banner and B r i c k y a r d , The Cour t 
may t h e n e i t h e r r e j e c t t h e S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n a s a r e q u e s t fo r 
c h a n g e s i n s u b s t a n t i v e law f or c o n s i d e r t h e m e r i t s of t h e 
p r o p o s e d amendments t o Rule 2 7 . If t h e m e r i t s a r e r e a c h e d , t h o s e 
amendments shou ld be a d o p t e d fo r t h e r e a s o n s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d . 
DATED t h i s of May, 1 9 8 6 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
DAVID B. THOMPSON j / 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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S a l t Lake Legal Defenders Assn . , 333 South Second Eas t , S a l t Lake 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (415 9) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7 6 06 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: RULE 27, UTAH : PETITION FOR AMENDMENT 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO RULE 
The State of Utah, through its counsel, David B. 
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, petitions this Court for 
the following amendments to Utah R. Crim P. 27 (codified as UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-35-27 (1982)): 
77-35-27. Rule 27—Stays pending appeal. (a)(1) A 
sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for 
other relief is pending. 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation 
shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and a certificate of 
probable cause is issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of 
any order or judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by 
the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal. 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if 
the court hearing the application determines that there are 
pes* 
' FBI ° 1°P^  
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meritorious issuea that ghould be decided by the appellate court 
the defendant has filed a notice of appeal and that the appeal is 
not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of 
law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new 
trial. A certificate of probable cau3e may be iooucd by the 
trial court or ,—if denied by the trial court,—by the court to 
whom an appeal is taken. Application for a certificate of 
probable cause must be made to the trial courtt The trial 
court's decision on the application is subject to review by the 
court in which the appeal is pending. The application for a 
certificate of probable cause shall be in writing, state the 
grounds for the issuance of the certificate and shall be served 
upon the prosecuting attorney. A hearing on the application for 
a certificate of probable cause shall be held after notice to all 
parties. 
(c) If a certificate of probable cause is denied, the 
defendant shall commence or continue to undergo sentence. If the 
certificate of probable cause is granted, the court granting the 
certificate may continue the defendant in custody at an 
appropriate place of detention, or admit the defendant to bail or 
release pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions. Th£ 
court shall not release the defendant pending appeal unless it 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person 
or the community if released. The decision on the request of the 
defendant for release to bail pending appeal is subject to review 
by the appellate court in which the appeal is pending for abuse 
of discretion. ja 
DATED this l I day of February, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON // 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1987 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of tbe state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Repealed and Reenacted. 
Section 59-2-1317, as renumbered and amended 
by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1987, is repealed and 
reenacted to read: 
59-2-1317. Index of propety owners and taxes -
Tax notice • Collection of taxes. 
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the 
county treasurer shall index the names of all prop-
erty owners shown by the assessment roll The 
commission shall prescribe a form of index which 
shall be uniform in all the counties throughout the 
state. 
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes 
and furnish to each taxpayer, except those taxpayers 
under Sections 39-2-1302 and 59-2-1307, by 
mail, postage prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's 
residence or usual place of business, if known, a 
notice containing: (a) the kind and value of property 
assessed to the taxpayer; (b) the street address of the 
property, where applicable; (c) the amount of tax 
levied; and (d) if no notice has been provided under 
Section 59-2-919, the days fixed by the county 
board of equalization for hearing complaints. The 
notice shall set out the aggregate amount of taxes to 
be paid for state, county, city, town, school, and 
other purposes. 
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for 
a prior tax within a period of four years and has not 
been redeemed, the treasurer shall stamp on the 
notice "Prior taxes are delinquent on this parcel. 
Final tax sale pending." The notice shall set out 
separately all taxes levied only on a certain kind or 
class of property for a special purpose or purposes, 
and shall have printed or stamped on it the effective 
rate of taxation for each purpose for which taxes 
have been levied, when and where payable, the date 
the taxes will be delinquent, and the penalty prov-
ided by law. 
(4) The notice shall be mailed at least ten days 
before the first day the county board of equalization 
meets to hear complaints if no increase in the certi-
fied tax rate is proposed, or by November 1 if an 
increase in the certified tax rate is proposed under 
the procedures established in Section 59-2-919. 
The notice shall be in duplicate form and the county 
treasurer need not mail out a tax receipt acknowle-
dging payment. 
(5) After notices have been mailed, the county 
treasurer shall make available the assessment roll, 
map books, and statements to the clerk of the 
county board of equalization. 
Section 2. Retrospective operation. 
This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 
1988. 
REPORT HB79 
H. B. No. 79 
Passed 2-24-88, Approved 3-15-88 
Effective 4-25-88 
Laws of Utah 1988, Chapter 160 
Bail Amendments 
By Ervin M. Skousen 
An Act relating to criminal procedure; provi-
ding guidelines for the release of a person 
sentenced to incarceration during an appeal 
of the sentence. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
77-20-1, as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 
1980 
77-20-8, as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 
1980 
ENACTS: 
77-20-8.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
77-20-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Be it enacted by tot Legislature of tbe state of Vtab: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 77-20-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1980, is 
amended to read: 
77-20-1. Right to bail - Cases requiring hearing. 
{]) A person charged with or arrested for a public 
offense shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right 
[in all cases}, except where the proof is evident or 
the presumption of guilt is strong that the accused 
committed a: 
[HfAl (a) capital offense; 
((2) A] (b) felony while he was free on bail awai-
ting trial on a previous felony; or 
[(3) A) (c) felony while he was on probation or 
parole for a felony. 
(2) {In thtsa cases] Under Subsection (1), the 
accused may be admitted to bail only by a (m*g*s-
tfate) circuit or district court judge, or upon the 
circuit or district court's refusal!?! and upon good 
cause shown, by a judge of the Court of Appeals, 
or a justice of the Supreme Court, after hearing and 
finding that the interests of justice do not require 
detention without bail. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 77-20-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1980, is 
amended to read* 
77-20-8. Grounds for detaining or releasing 
defendant on conviction and prior to sentence. 
(1) (a) Upon conviction, by plea or tnai, the court 
[mayl shall order [aj that the convicted defendant 
(to be taken into custody or may order the bail 
continued pending imposition of) who is waiting 
imposition or execution of sentence be detained, 
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evid-
ence presented by the defendant that the defendant 
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is not hkelv to flee the junsdiction of the coun and 
will not pose a danger to the physical, psycholog-
ical or tinanciai and economic safety or well being 
ot anv other person or the community if released 
(b) If the coun finds the defendant does not need 
to be detained, the court shall order the release ot 
the defendant on suitable conditions, which may 
include the conditions under Subsection 77 20-
10(2) 
[The sureties mayt at any time prior to a forfei 
ture of their baih sunendef the defendant and 
obtain exoneration of tfaeu bail by filing written 
requests therefor at the time of the surrender) 
[(2) To effect surrender+ a certified oopy, in 
duplicate, of the undertaking shall be delivered to a 
peace officer, who shall then detain the defendant in 
his custody as upon a commitment, and who shall in 
writing acknowledge the surrtadtf upon one oopy of 
the undertaking! This atrtified espy of the under* 
aking upon whiah the acknowledgment of surrender 
n endorsed shall be filed with the eowti The court 
premium paid* or part of a prcmwi as it deems 
J**5t J 
[(3) For the purpose of surrendering the defen 
dam, the sureties^ at any time before they are finally 
exonerated and at any place within the statet may 
arrest him.] 
Section 3. Section Enacted. 
Section 77-20-8 5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read 
77-20-3.5. Safeties - Surrender of defendant -
Arrest of defendant. 
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time pnor to a 
forfeiture of their bail surrender the defendant and 
obtain exoneration of their bail by filing written 
requests at the time of the surrender. 
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies 
of the undertaking shall be delivered to a peace 
officer, who shall detain the defendant in his 
custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing 
acknowledge the surrender upon one copy of the 
undertaking. This certified copy of the undertaking 
upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is 
endorsed shall be filed with the court. The court 
may then, upon proper application, order the und-
ertaking exonerated and may order a refund of any 
paid premium, or part of a premium, as it finds 
just 
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, 
the sureties may arrest him at any time before they 
are finally exonerated and at any place within the 
state 
Section 4. Section Enacted. 
Section 77-20-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read 
77-20-10. Grounds for detaining defendant while 
appealing his conviction - Conditions for release 
while on appeal. 
(1) The court shall order that a defendant who 
has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment In jail or prison, and 
who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, be detained, unless the court finds: 
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of law 
or fact likely to result in: 
(1) reversal, 
(u) an order for a new trial; or 
(in) a sentence that does not include a term of 
I imprisonment in jail or prison i 
I (b) the appeal is not tor the purpose ot delay, and 
I (c) by clear and convincing evidence presented bv I 
I the defendant that he is not likely to flee the juris-
diction ot the court, and will not pose a danger to 
I the physical, psychological, or tinanciai and econ-
omic safety or well-being of anv other person or 
I the community if released | 
(2) If the court makes a finding under Subsection 
(1) which justifies not detaining the defendant, the 
court shall order the release of the defendant, 
subject to conditions that result in the least restric-
tive condition or combination of conditions that the 
court determines will reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person as required and the safety of any j 
other person and the community The conditions I 
may include that the defendant- I 
(a) post appropriate bail; 
(b) not commit a federal, state, or local crime 
during the period of release; 
(c) remain in the custody of a designated person 
I who agrees to assume supervisxm of the defendant 
and who agrees to report any violation of a release 
condition to the court, if the designated person is 
reasonably able to assure the court that the defen-
dant will appear as required and will not pose a 
danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community; 
(d) maintain employment, or if unemployed, act-
ively seek employment; 
(e) maintain or commence an educational 
program; 
(Q abide by specified restrictions on personal 
associations, place of abode, or travel, 
(g) avoid all contact with the victims of the 
offense and with any witnesses who testified against 
the defendant or potential witnesses who may testify 
concerning the offense if the appeal results in a 
reversal or an order for a new trial; 
(h) report on a regular basis to a designated law 
enforcement agency, pretrial services agency, or 
other designated agency; 
(i) comply with a specified curfew; 
(j) not possess a firearm, destructive device, or 
other dangerous weapon; 
(k) not use alcohol, or any narcotic drug or other 
controlled substances except as prescribed by a lic-
ensed medical practitioner; 
(1) undergo available medical, psychological, or 
psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug 
or alcohol dependency, and remain under the supe-
rvision of or in a specified institution if required for 
that purpose; 
(m) execute an agreement to forfeit, upon failing 
to appear as required, designated property, inclu-
ding money, as is reasonably necessary to assure the 
appearance of the defendant, and post with the 
court indicia of ownership of the property or a 
! percentage of the money as the court may specify, | 
I (n) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties in an 
amount necessary to assure the appearance of the 
defendant as required, 
(o) return to custody for specified hours following 
release for employment, schooling, or other limited 
purposes; 
(p) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably 
necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant 
as required and to assure the safety of any other 
person and the community; and 
(q) if convicted of committing a sexual offense or 
an assault or other offense involving violence 
against a child 17 years of age or younger, is limited | 
or denied access _u? mv location or oieupa 
where children are including but not umued to 
(0 anv residence xvnere Lnildren are on the pr 
ses 
u) activities including organized activities 
which children are Invoived and 
(in) locations ^vnere children congregate or wh 
a reasonable person should know that child 
congregate 
(3) The court may, in its discretion amend 
order granting release to impose additional or d 
erent conditions ot release 
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COURT RULES 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
IN RE: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE TO 
BE USED IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE 
Effective January 1, 1989 
PER CURIAM; 
Pursuant to the provisions of article VIII, section 4 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah, as amended, and rule 11-101(3XE) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, the Court adopts all existing statutory rules of proce-
dure and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 
(1982 & Supp.1988) not inconsistent with or superseded by rules of 
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, with the 
exception of section 77-35-12(g) (see State v. Mendozay 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987)) and section 77-35-21.5(4X0 and (d) (see State v. Copeland, 
97 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 [765 P.2d 1266] (Dec. 6, 1988)). Effective as of 
January 1, 1989. 
FILED 
January 13, 1989 
Geoffrev J. Butler 
Clerk 
NOTICE" Court rules and related mater.als supplied by the courts are included. 
Since all rules and amendment^ ma\ not ~.a\e ^eer. supplied, the clerk of the appropri-
ate court should be consulted to determine tne current rules. 
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MINUTES 
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Monday, February 8, 1988, 5:30 p.m. 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Presiding 
PRESENT 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr, 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
David Schwendiman 
Earl Dorius 
Peter Stirba 
Judge Dennis Fuchs 
Prof. Lionel Frankel 
EXCUSED 
Marcus Taylor 
Judge Cullen Christensen 
Robert Stott 
Prof. Michael Goldsmith 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Karma Dixon 
Brooke Wells 
Staff 
Carlie Christensen 
1. Welcome. Stewart Hanson welcomed the 
committee members to the meeting. 
2. Minutes. The committee voted to approve the 
minutes from the January 25, 1988 meeting. 
3. Rule 11. Chairman Hanson reported that he 
had reviewed Rule 11 in its entirety for the purpose of 
revising the rule and making it gender neutral 
throughout. Mr. Hanson recommended three specific 
changes. First, he recommended that the word "his" be 
deleted from the second sentence in paragraph (C) of the 
rule and that the sentence read "In non-felony cases, the 
court shall advise the defendant or counsel of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial." Second, he recommended that the phrase "his/her" 
in subsection (E)(1) of the rule be amended to "the" so 
that the sentence would read "That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel, defendant has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Finally, 
he recommended that the phrase "his/her" in subparagraph 
(E)(5) of the rule be amended to "a" so that the sentence 
would read "That the defendant is competent to enter a 
plea." 
Chairman Hanson then suggested that the committee 
discuss the issues resulting from the ambiguous language 
contained in 11(G). Earl Dorius suggested that the 
language of 11(G) implies that the plea has already been 
entered and that the confusion could be eliminated with a 
modification to 11(G). He recommended that the word 
"Thereafter" be deleted in the last sentence of 11(G) and 
that after the phrase "If the judge decides," in that same 
sentence, the language "after the plea has been entered" 
should be added. Judge Page agreed with Mr. Dorius' 
recommendation and indicated that the confusion arose from 
the ambiguity as to whether the judge changed his or her 
mind after the entry of the plea. 
Mr. Dorius questioned whether 11(G) should be 
modified to contain specific language prohibiting a Judge 
from engaging in the plea bargaining process. Judge Fuchs 
indicated that the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited 
judges from engaging in ex parte communications with 
counsel and that such a prohibition should be sufficient. 
Judge Fuchs moved to approve Rule 11 with the 
modifications recommended by Chairman Hanson and Mr. 
Dorius. Judge Medley seconded the motion. The committee 
voted unanimously to approve Rule 11 and distribute it for 
public comment. 
4. Rule 11 Advisory Comments. Chairman Hanson 
recommended that the committee review and discuss the 
proposed advisory comments to Rule 11 so that the proposed 
comments could be approved and published with the rule. 
He referred the committee to the proposed comments which 
had been distributed at the last meeting and asked the 
committee members whether there was any discussion. Mr. 
Dorius suggested that the comments should include an 
explanation about the revisions to 11(G). Chairman Hanson 
indicated that the comments included an explanation that 
the changes to the rule were made to promote clarity and 
to remove gender biased language. He suggested that the 
existing explanation would be sufficient. 
David Schwendiman made a motion to approve the 
advisory comments. Judge Page seconded the motion. The 
committeed voted unanimously to approve the proposed 
advisory comments and publish them with the rule for 
public comment. 
5. Rule 27. Chairman Hanson asked whether the 
Rule 27 subcommittee was prepared to discuss further 
modifications to Rule 27. David Schwendiman indicated 
that the members of the subcommittee had not had the 
opportunity to research the issues raised at the last 
committee meeting and requested that the dicussion on Rule 
27 be deferred until the next committee meeting. 
6. Rule 12, Chairman Hanson indicated that in 
light of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State 
v. Mendoza, that the committee should study Rule 12. 
Chairman Hanson suggested that a subcommittee be 
established to study the rule and asked which committee 
members would like to serve on the subcommittee. After 
some discussion, Chairman Hanson appointed Peter Stirba as 
the Chair of the subcommittee and appointed David 
Schwendiman, Earl Dorius, Professor Frankel and Marcus 
Taylor as members. 
7. Criminal Procedure Subcommittee. Carlie 
Christensen explained that the committee as a whole needed 
to begin its study of the rules of criminal procedure to 
determine which are substantive and which are procedural 
and should be repealed from the Utah Code. Ms. 
Christensen reminded the committee that legislation had 
been introduced this year to repeal all of the rules of 
criminal procedure but that the sponsor of the legislation 
had agreed to withdraw it until the advisory committee had 
the opportunity to study the rules and make 
recommendations. 
Chairman Hanson suggested that the committee 
needed to review the law in this area prior to undertaking 
its study of the rules and asked Ms. Christensen to 
research the distinction between procedural and 
substantive and distribute to the committee any 
information which would be helpful in making that 
determination. Chairman Hanson also suggested that if the 
research material could be provided to the committee 
members prior to the next meeting, that the committee 
members should be prepared to discuss Rule 1 through 4 of 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and make preliminary 
recommendations as to whether those rules are procedural 
or substantive. 
8. Legislative Update. Carlie Christensen 
indicated to the committee members that H.B. 79 containing 
amendments to the bail provisions of the Code had passed 
the House and had been referred to the Senate. She 
indicated that she had delivered a letter to 
Representative Skousen under Chairman Hanson's signature 
outlining the committee's concerns with the legislation. 
She indicated that Representative Skousen was willing to 
modify the legislation only to the extent necessary to 
make the bill compatible with the proposed constitutional 
language. Chairman Hanson asked the committee whether 
there was any action which could be taken by the committee 
concerning this bill prior to the legislative session. 
The committee members felt that there was not enough time 
prior to the session to finalize their recommendations on 
Rule 27. Chairman Hanson then asked whether committee 
members individually could take any action which might 
minimize the problems created by passage of the proposed 
legislation. David Schwendiman indicated that he would be 
willing to meet with Representative Skousen concerning the 
bill and propose modifications which would make the 
legislation compatible with the constitutional language. 
Ms. Christensen recommended that Dave Thompson from the 
Attorney General's Office be included in that meeting 
since Mr. Thompson had assisted in the drafting and 
preparation of the legislation. Professor Frankel also 
indicated that he would be willing to meet with 
Representative Skousen. Ms. Christensen offered to assist 
in arranging the meeting. 
9. Publication Schedule. Ms. Christensen 
indicated that she had been working with the Michie and 
Code-Co. publishing companies to establish a firm 
publication date for the rules. She explained that once a 
firm publication date was established, that the Supreme 
Court intended to adopt a rule which would contain a 
timetable for all committees to follow during the 
rulemaking process. The rule will provide that each 
committee receives petitions and studies proposed 
modifications to the Rules for 6 to 8 months of the year 
and that when the committees complete their study, all of 
the rules will be submitted to Code-Co at once for 
publication. The rule will also provide that once the 
public comment period has expired and the rules have been 
submitted to the Supreme Court, the Court will have 60 
days to act on the proposed rules. Upon expiration of the 
60 day period, all modifications approved by the Court 
would be published in a single volume of Court rules. Any 
rules which are not acted upon by the Court during the 60 
day period, will be held until the next year. Ms. 
Christensen explained that a uniform rulemaking process 
would ensure that the Court Rules publication was always 
current and would streamline the committee's work. 
10. Meeting Schedule. The committee agreed to 
hold its next meeting on March 14, 1988 at 5:30 p.m. at 
the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
11. Adjournment. There being no further 
business, the meeting was adjourned. 
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MINUTES OF THS 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION 
JANUARY 15, 1988-12 NOON-ROOM 436 STATE CAPITOL 
Members Present: Dr. Karl N. Snow, Jr., Chairman 
Mr. William G. Fowler, Vice-Chairman 
Sen. Lyle W. Hillyard 
Rep. R. Haze Hunter 
Mr. Clirford S. LeFevre 
Rep. Ted D. Lewis 
Mr. Gayle F. McKeachnie 
Mr. Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 
Mr. Richard V. Strong 
Justice Michael D. Zimmerman 
Members Excused: 
Also Present: 
Staff F resent: 
Sen. WilforJ R. Black 
Sea. Arnold Christensen 
Mr. Raymond L. Hixson 
Dr. Phyllis C. Southwick 
Rep. Oiene S. WalJcer 
Ms. Mary Anno Q. Wood 
Ms. Carlie Christensen, Office of the State Court Administrator 
Judge Scott Daniels, Third District Court 
Sen* Winn L. Richards 
Robin L, Riggs, Executive Director 
Joy Jensen, Secretary 
1. Call to Order—Chairman Snow called the meeting to order at 12:15 p.m. 
2. Bail Provision—Chairman Snow stated that at the last meeting the CRC had 
requested the Governor's Council or. Victims and the Supreme Court's Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Procedure to make a recommendation for amending Art. I, 
Sec. 8 of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Riggs distributed copies of the completed 
proposal to CRC members (copy on file in the Office of Legislative Research and 
General Counsel). 
Chairman Snow then asked Carlie Christensen, Office of the State Court 
Administrator, to review the recommendation. She stated that it was difficult to 
find a consensus among members of the advisory committee and that the proposal 
represents a majority viewpoint and not unanimity. The proposal retains the existing 
categories of offenders that may be denied bail: persons charged with a capital 
offense, and persona charged with a felony while on probation or parole or while free 
on bail awaiting trial oo a previous felony charge. She stated that the only difficulty 
with the language was in defining what standard is meant by "proof is evident or the 
presumption strong*" Most lawyers she contacted did not understand the standard 
because of the archaic language. As a result, the proposal deletes that language and 
replaces it with "substantial eridenc*/ which is a more understandable term. The 
proposal then adds one other category of offender that may be denied bail: persons 
charged with a crime when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person would constitute a danger to any other person or to the community or is likely 
to flee the Jurisdiction erf the court if released on bail. 
Minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission 
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Ms* Christensen stated that there were two substantial issues of debate 
concerning the new category. First, the category is all persons charged with a 
crime, rather than just a felony. The drafting committee initially recommended 
"felony" because of a concern that under "crime," misdemeanor offenders could be 
held without bail on evidence unrelated to the offense. However, the majority of the 
full committee disagreed and retained the word "crime" in the proposal. Second, the 
standard for determining danger to the community and others is "clear and 
convincing evidence." The drafting committee initially recommended a standard of 
"substantial danger." The full committee retained "clear and convincing evidence" 
because of the overuse of the word "substantial" and a concern that "substantial 
danger" was ambiguous. 
She then explained that the proposed second paragraph provides a right to bail 
pending appeal as provided by law, as opposed to the first paragraph which provides 
for pre-conviction bail. She stated that the committee decided to recommend that 
the Legislature deterrine the standards for post-conviction bail under the second 
paragraph. Finally, she stated that two committee members rejected the proposal 
outright, although a majority of seven members approved it. 
The CRC then discussed the use of the word "crime" as opposeo to "felony." 
Judge Daniels, Third District Court, and Ms. Christensen both stated that "crime" 
provides greater flexibility to Judges. Justice Zimmerman and Mr. Fowler argued 
that the use of the word "felony" wa3 sufficient to protect the public. Justice 
Zimmerman then stated that under the word "crime," justices of the peace could 
deny bail for misdemeanor offenses, which concerns him. 
MOTION: Justice Zimmerman moved, seconded by Mr. Fowler, to replace 
"crime" with "felony" in the proposal in the category of persons posing a danger or 
likely to flee. The motion passed una~;m^usly with all members marked present at 
the meeting voting in favor. 
Sen. Hillyard then suggested mat the word "substantial" be inserted before the 
word "danger" in the Droposal where it states "evidence that the person would 
constitute a danger to any other person or to the community." Rep. Lewis stated 
that he would prefer to have a lesser standard of proof than a lesser standard of 
danger. There was additional discussion on this issue. 
MOTION: Sen. Hillyard moved, seconded by Rep. Lewis, to insert "substantial" 
before "danger" in the draft where it refers to danger to others and the community. 
The motion passed unanimously with all members marked present at the meeting 
voting In favor. 
The CRC also decided to retain the use of the phrase "as prescribed by law" in 
the aecood paragraph of the proposal because it can mean statutes, court rules, or 
court cases. There was also more discussion on the issue of Judicial discretion in 
denying bail under the language of the proposal. 
Minutes of the Constitutional Revision Commission 
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Chairman Snow then introduced Sen. Winn L. Richards, wno has a.read\ filed a 
constitutional amendment to make substantially the ^ame ehsn^es *o the Utah 
Constitution as those recommended today. 
MOTION: Rep. Lewis moved, seconded by Mr. LeFevre. to recommend 
favorably to the Legislature the proposal, as amended, of the Supreme Court's 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Procedure to amend \rt. 1, Sec. 8. J^J^e Pamols 
stated that the Governor's Council on Victims *ould probabU i* ie w th the 
recommendation. The motion passed unanimously with all members mi-*ed present 
at the meeting voting in favor. 
Sen. Richards then agreed to substitute the CHC * e c o ^ - i r o n -to Ks 
proposal. 
3. Other Business—Mr. Matheson distributed a statement on beha!r of himself, 
Chairman Snow, and Justice Zimmerman relating to tKe fiscal home r- e po*er:> of 
local governments (copy on file in the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel). 
*• Adjournment—The meeting was adjourned at 1:10 p.m. 
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UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 
1953 
REPLACEMENT 
VOLUME 8C 
1982 EDITION 
Code of Criminal Procedure 
77-35-27. Rule 27 — Stays pending appeal, (a) (1) A sentence of death 
shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for other relief is pending. 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if 
an appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judg-
ment in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good 
cause pending disposition of the appeal. 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing 
the application determines that there are meritorious issues that should 
be decided by the appellate court. A certificate of probable cause may be 
issued by the trial court or, if denied by the trial court, by the court to 
whom an appeal is taken. The application for a certificate of probable cause 
shall be in writing, state the grounds for the issuance of the certificate 
and shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney. A hearing on the appli-
cation for a certificate of probable cause shall be held after notice to all 
parties. 
(c) If a certificate of probable cause is denied, the defendant shall com-
mence or continue to undergo sentence. If the certificate of probable cause 
is granted, the court granting the certificate may continue the defendant 
in custody at an appropriate place of detention, or admit the defendant 
to bail or release pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions. The 
decision on the request of the defendant for release to bail is subject to 
review by the appellate court for abuse of discretion. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-27, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1. 
